EU Climate Concerns: Balancing Climate Cooperation and Competition with China
In June 2024, I had the opportunity to attend the UACES Graduate Forum held at the Vreie Universiteit Amsterdam, in part thanks to UACES’ funding support for early career researchers attending such activities. PhD students often face limited funding, which significantly impacts their ability to attend academic workshops, seminars, and conferences—events that are crucial for their professional development and degree requirements. These engagements are not only essential for earning their diploma but also play a vital role in obtaining necessary certifications and qualifications for pursuing an academic career post-PhD. Therefore, initiatives such as the UACES funding support and microgrants hold great value. In my case, UACES’ support allowed me to share and get feedback from a discussant and my fellow participants on my thesis proposal, which aims to develop a holistic understanding of the policy process when it comes to the nexus between Chinese climate, renewable energy, and green technologies.
EU-China relations have faced significant challenges recently due to China’s inward turn during COVID-19, rising economic competition, and political tensions, leading to disrupted communications. Amid this backdrop, EU policymakers have prioritized environment and climate as focal points in their partnership with China, using them to keep dialogue open. China agreed with this sentiment during the 2023 China-EU High Level Dialogue on Environment and Climate (European Commission, 2023). However, green technology has linked climate policy with more tense policy areas, such as supply chain vulnerabilities and trade imbalances, placing it at the forefront of the EU’s de-risking approach in multiple ways.
The Climate Factor in the EU’s De-Risking
As the EU intensifies its efforts to transition towards a sustainable, low-carbon economy, it heavily relies on critical materials and advanced technologies, many of which originate from China. Thus, China’s policy shifts can impact the availability and cost of essential green tech inputs. For instance, China’s export restrictions on key electric vehicle battery components can disrupt the EU’s supply chains, affecting its green technology industries and overall climate goals. Moreover, trade imbalances further complicate the relationship. The EU’s significant imports of Chinese green technology products, such as solar panels and electric vehicles, and of their components, including a wide array of critical raw materials, contribute to economic asymmetry, which can fuel political tensions and protectionist measures, like the EU’s anti-subsidy investigations. These dynamics, and the targets the EU has set for itself in relevant pieces of legislation such as the Critical Raw Materials Act (Regulation 2024/1252), or key acts within the Fit-for-55 package, such as the Net-Zero Industry Act (2023/0081/COD), underscore the necessity for the EU to stay informed about China’s green tech strategies to anticipate and mitigate potential disruptions.
In short, by comprehensively understanding China’s policies, the EU can better navigate the complex interplay between cooperation and competition. This knowledge enables the EU to devise strategies that enhance supply chain resilience, reduce dependency on single sources, and foster sustainable trade practices. Additionally, it can inform the EU’s de-risking approach, ensuring that the green transition is not only technologically feasible but also economically and politically stable. In essence, staying abreast of China’s green technology policies is vital for safeguarding the EU’s strategic interests and achieving its long-term environmental objectives.
Learning from China’s Climate Policy
The EU views climate policy predominantly through an environmental lens, prioritizing the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the preservation of biodiversity, and the promotion of sustainable practices to combat climate change. The EU’s approach is characterized by ambitious targets for carbon neutrality, stringent environmental regulations, and substantial investments in renewable energy and green technologies. This perspective is rooted in a broader commitment to environmental stewardship and the recognition of climate change as an urgent global crisis that requires immediate and sustained action. Conversely, China approaches climate policy through a developmental lens, integrating climate action with its broader economic growth and development objectives. For China, climate policy is intertwined with the goals of reducing poverty, improving living standards, and achieving technological and industrial modernization. This developmental perspective emphasizes the need to balance environmental considerations with economic growth, ensuring that climate actions contribute to the overall development and prosperity of the nation. This fundamental difference in perspectives underscores the varied approaches to climate policy between the EU and China, with each region tailoring its strategies to align with its unique priorities and challenges.
With this in mind, understanding China’s green technology policies will not only aid the EU in furthering its de-risking process by preparing for potential shocks, but also allow the Union to use China as a benchmark for its green technology policies by analysing and adapting successful strategies, technologies, and policy frameworks that have propelled China to become a global leader in green tech. China has implemented robust policy frameworks and financial incentives to promote green technology development. These include subsidies, tax incentives, and government-led investments in research and development. The EU can evaluate the effectiveness of these policies and consider similar mechanisms to stimulate its green tech sector. For example, China’s aggressive targets for renewable energy capacity and EV adoption provide a model for setting ambitious but achievable goals. The collaboration between the Chinese government and private sector in advancing green technology is another area where the EU can draw lessons. By fostering similar partnerships, the EU can leverage private sector innovation and investment to complement public initiatives, thereby accelerating the development and deployment of green technologies. Lastly, and more explicitly linked to the current de-risking approach, the EU can learn from China’s strategies to secure supply chains, build domestic capacity, and manage international trade relations in relation to green technologies. This knowledge can help the EU develop resilient green tech supply chains, reduce dependency on single sources, and ensure the steady supply of critical materials.
